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NATIONAL PANASONIC (U.K.) LTD. v. E.C. COMMISSION-
ANTITRUST'INVESTIGATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COM-
MUNITY: PRIOR NOTICE AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
National Panasonic challenged a decision adopted by the EEC
Commission pursuant to article 14 of Regulation 17/62, which
authorizes investigations of corporate headquarters in antitrust
cases. The basis of the complaint was that the Commission did not
provide National Panasonic with prior notice of a pending an-
titrust investigation of National Panasonic's business records. Na-
tional Panasonic claimed that thedecision constituted a violation
of its fundamental rights, as well as a failure to comply with the
spirit of the Regulation.
National Panasonic (UK) Ltd., a subsidiary of the Japanese Mat-
sushita Electric Trading Company Ltd., is incorporated and doing
business in the United Kingdom as the exclusive distributor of
National Panasonic and Technics products. National Panasonic
Vertriebsgesellschaft GmbH is also a subsidiary of the Japanese
company and is the distributor of National Panasonic and Tech-
nics products in the Federal Republic of Germany. In 1977, Na-
tional Panasonic Vertriebsgesellschaft provided the Commission
of the European Economic Community (EEC) with notice of an
agreement concerning distribution of National Panasonic products
in Germany and requested a negative clearance or an exemption
pursuant to article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty.' The information
received by the Commission from the German Company led the
Commission to suspect that the British Company was operating a
ban on exports from the United Kingdom to West Germany in
violation of the EEC Treaty. The Commission decided' to conduct
an investigation of National Panasonic (UK) pursuant to article
14(3) of Regulation number 17' of the Council to determine
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, No. 4300, 298
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter cited as the EEC Treaty). Article 85 (3) provides that practices
usually forbidden can be declared permissible if they contribute to improved production or
distribution of goods or to technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair
share of the resulting benefit.
' The technical definition of decision refers to a formal proceeding undertaken by the
Commission in which reasons in favor of an investigation are stated, including the subject
matter to be examined, the purpose of the investigation, the date on which it is to begin,
and the fines imposed for refusal to submit.
' Regulation No. 17, 5 O.J. COMM. EUR. 205 (1962). The sections of Regulation 17/62 perti-
nent to this paper are listed below. Article 11 of the Regulation provides that:
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1) In the execution of the duties assigned to it by Article 89 and by provisions
pursuant to Article 87 of the Treaty, the Commission shall have power to seek all
necessary information from the governments and competent authorities of the
Member States as well as from enterprises and associations of enterprises.
2) When sending a request for information to an enterprise or association of
enterprises, the Commission shall at the same time address a copy of this request
to the competent authority in the Member State in the territory of which the
principal place of business of the enterprise or association of enterprises is
situated.
3) In its request, the Commission shall indicate the legal basis and the purpose of
the same, and the penalties for supplying false information laid down in Article
15(1)(b) of this regulation.
4) Information must be supplied on request by the owners of the enterprises or by
their representatives and, in the case of legal persons, of companies, or of associa-
tions without legal personalities, by the persons responsible for representing
them according to the law or the memorandum or articles of association.
5) Where the enterprise or association of enterprises does not supply the informa-
tion required within the time limit set by the Commission, or supplies incomplete
information, the Commission's request for information shall be made by means of
a decision. This decision shall specify the information requested, fix an appro-
priate time-limit within which it is to be supplied and specify the sanctions appli-
cable under Article 15(l)(b) and under Article 16(1)(c) and shall indicate that there
is a right to institute proceedings against the decision before the Court of Justice.
6) The Commission shall at the same time send a copy of its decision to the compe-
tent authorities of the Member State in the territory of which the principal place
of business of the enterprise or association of enterprises is situated.
Article 14 of Regulation 17 provides that:
1) In execution of the duties assigned to it by Article 89 and by provisions laid
down pursuant to Article 87 of the Treaty, the Commission may conduct all
necessary investigations into the affairs of enterprises and associations of enter-
prises. To this end, the servants authorized by the Commission shall be vested
with the following powers:
a) to examine the books and other business documents;
b) to make copies of, or extracts from the same;
c) to ask for verbal explanations on the spot;
d) to have access to all premises, land and vehicles of enterprises.
2) The servants authorized by the Commission for these investigations shall exer-
cise their powers on production of a written warrant stating the nature and pur-
pose of the inquiry and the fines provided for in Article 15(l)(c) in the event of
incomplete submission of the books or other business documents required. The
Commission shall in good time advise the competent authority of the Member
State in the territory of which the investigation is to take place, of this investiga-
tion, stating the name and office of the authorized servant.
3) The enterprises and associations of enterprises must submit to the investiga-
tions ordered by a decision of the Commission. The decision shall state the sub-
ject and purpose of the inquiry, fix the date when it is to begin, and call attention
to the sanctions provided for under Article 15(1)(c) and Article 16(1)(d), and shall
indicate that there is a right to institute proceedings against the decision before
the Court of Justice.
4) Before taking the decisions referred to in paragraph 3, the Commission shall
consult the competent authorities of the Member State in the territory of which
the investigation is to be carried out.
5) The servants of the competent authority of the Member State in the territory
of which the investigation is to be carried out may, at the request of this author-
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whether Article 85' of the EEC Treaty was being violated.
The investigation was performed by two Commission officials
and by an agent from the United Kingdom's Office of Fair
Trading.' No advance notification was given to National Panasonic
before the investigators appeared at its offices. The investigation
was initiated prior to the arrival of the company's lawyer and no
explanation for the search was provided. National Panasonic
received no prior request for information or for access to its
premises. The company was not provided an opportunity either to
affect the content of the decision or to question its legality before
submitting to the investigation. National Panasonic challenged the
validity of the decision to conduct the investigation and requested
an annulment in accordance with articles 1736 and 174' of the EEC
ity or of the Commission, lend assistance to the Commission's servants in their
duties.
6) Where an enterprise resists an investigation ordered pursuant to the present
Article, the Member State concerned shall lend the servants authorized by the
Commission the assistance necessary to enable them to carry out the investiga-
tion. The Member State shall, after consulting the Commission, take the
necessary measures for this purpose before October 1, 1962.
IdL
EEC Treaty article 85 prohibits the following arrangements as incompatible with the
common market:
All agreements between undertakings, decision by associations of undertakings
and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States having
as their object or effect, the prevention, distortion, or restriction of competition
within the common market and in particular, those practices which:
a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trad-
ing conditions;
b) limit or control production, markets, technical developments, or in-
vestment;
c) share markets or sources of supply;
d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trad-
ing parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage.
Id.
The EEC Commission is instructed by the Treaty to work closely with the competent
authorities of the Member States. Article 89 also provides that the Commission shall con-
duct its investigations in concert with the authorities of the Member States.
EEC Treaty article 173 states:
The Court of Justice shall review the legality of acts of the Council and the
Commission other than recommendations or opinions. It shall for this purpose
have jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member State, the Council or the Com-
mission on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural
requirement, infringement of this Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its appli-
cation or misuse of powers.
Any natural or legal person may, under the same conditions, institute pro-
ceedings against a decision addressed to that person.
Id.
EEC Treaty article 174 states: "If the action is well founded the Court of Justice shall
declare the act concerned to be void." Id.
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Treaty. In addition, a plea was made for the return of all documents,
for the destruction of any notes, and for the prohibition of any fur-
ther use of the information reprinted by the investigators. National
Panasonic argued, inter alia, that the decision to search was a viola-
tion of article 14 of Regulation 17' and constituted an infringement
of its fundamental rights. Held: Dismissed.0 The Court of Justice
found that there was no infringement of Regulation 17 and that the
search did not constitute a violation of National Panasonic's fun-
damental rights.
The EEC is based on a policy of fair competition and removal of
trade barriers among Member States. Articles 85 and 861 contain
the substantive antitrust provisions of the EEC Treaty while ar-
ticles 871" and 89's contain the implementation and enforcement
mechanisms." The EEC accepts the premise that competition can
effectuate economic integration and optimal use of resources more
efficiently than can government planning. 5 Articles 85 and 86 pro-
hibit certain restrictive practices of enterprises as contrary to
EEC objectives. Any activity that substantially affects the ex-
istence, nature, or flow of trade either directly or indirectly is pro-
hibited.16
Articles 87 and 89 grant the Commission broad power to admin-
ister EEC competition laws. The power to grant exemptions 7 has
' National Panasonic also argued that the decision failed to include any foundation upon
which it was based.
' See note 3 supra. National Panasonic argued that the decision violated the spirit of the
provision.
" National Panasonic (UK) Ltd. v. E.C. Commission [1980] 3 COMM. MKT. L. R. (136t79).
" See article 85, supra note 4. EEC Treaty article 86 states that: "Any abuse by one or
more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market . . . shall be pro-
hibited .. . in so far as it may affect trade between member states." Id.
"1 EEC Treaty Article 87 states that "[w]ithin three years of the entry into force of this
Treaty, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after
consulting the Assembly, adopt any appropriate regulations or directives to give effect to
the principles set out in Articles 85 and 86." Id.
'0 Article 89 (1) states:
Without prejudice to article 88, the Commission shall ... ensure the application of
the principles laid down in articles 85 and 86. On application by a Member State
or on its own initiative, and in cooperation with the competent authorities in the
Member States, who shall give it their assistance, the Commission shall in-
vestigate cases of suspected infringements of these principles. If it finds that
there has been an infringement, it shall propose appropriate measures to bring it
to an end.
Id.
14 Id. R. GRAUPNER, THE RULES OF COMPETITION IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 6
(1965).
"See generally J. LANG, THE COMMON MARKET AND COMMON LAW (1966).
" Id. at 392.
" See note 1 supra.
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been centralized in the Commission, "subject to review of its deci-
sions by the European Court of Justice."18 The Council of the EEC
established Regulation 17/62's to implement the enforcement
mechanisms envisioned within articles 87 and 89. This regulation
provides two alternative investigation procedures, and procedure
selection is left solely to the discretion of the Commission.' Arti-
cle 11 of Regulation 17 authorizes the Commission to request
information from officials of the Member States, as well as from
the enterprises under investigation, both of which are obliged to
comply. Article 14 empowers the Commission to conduct all
necessary investigations into the affairs and associations of enter-
prises. Both of these powers are given equal weight in the
treaties.2
When acting pursuant to article 11, the Commission conducts a
two-step procedure. The Commission first requests information
from the enterprise or Member State. If this request is not com-
plied with, the Commission is authorized to issue a decision order-
ing compliance. Thus, non-compliance with a request for informa-
tion is a condition precedent to the adoption of a decision.' Unlike
article 11, article 14 does not specifically mandate a two-step pro-
cedure for investigations. Although the structure of article 11
renders the request for information a condition precedent to the
adoption of a Commission decision, article 14 contains no such
preliminary requirement. The language of article 14(3) simply
requires that businesses submit to investigations ordered by the
Commission. The European Court of Justice had not decided
whether the procedure of article 11 would also be required for in-
vestigations conducted pursuant to article 14. This absence of
precedent left the matter open to speculation by legal commen-
tators, who were equally divided on the issue.
Commentators who believed it unnecessary for the Commis-
sion to go through the process of requesting information, of hav-
ing that request denied by the enterprise, and of adopting a deci-
sion for an "on the spot" inspection, generally emphasized the dif-
ferences in the wording of articles 11 and 14, as well as the un-
necessary duplication that would ensue if the two articles were
construed identically.s Other commentators, although recognizing
" EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 173.
" See note 3 supra.
m A. DERINGER, THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE EEC 333 (1968).
Id.
= See note 3 supra.
Lang, The Procedure of the Commission in Competition Cases, 14 COMM. MKT. L. REV.
155 (1977).
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the potential duplication argued that the procedure required by ar-
ticle 11 also should be required under article 14 to prevent the
Commission from acting upon mere intuition.2 '
Although no cases exist that are directly on point, similar ques-
tions have been resolved in other communities. The treaty form-
ing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)1 establishes
the power of the High Authority" to gather information. Without
mentioning procedure, the first paragraph of article 47 provides
that the High Authority may obtain information it requires and
that any necessary checks may be made. In Acciaieria di Brescia
v. High Authority,' it was argued that article 47 required the
High Authority to seek information before an investigation was
carried out. The European Court of Justice rejected that claim
and held that there was "nothing in the letter, spirit or aim of...
article 47 to prohibit information being obtained and a check being
made at the same time."'28 In effect, the Court of Justice refused to
read a two-stage procedure into article 47.
However, in Transocean Marine Paint Association v. EC Com-
mission,' a case which arose under the EEC Treaty, the European
Court of Justice rejected the contentions of the Commission that
it was under no duty to inform applicants for exemptions under
article 85(3) of "conditions or obligations" that it was considering
attaching, pursuant to article 8(1)M of Regulation 17, to a decision
' J. CUNNINGHAM, THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE EEC-A PRACTICAL GUIDE 91 (1973);
See generally A. DERINGER, supra note 20; and H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE EEC
(1973).
Treaty instituting the European Coal and Steel Community, April 18, 1951, 261
U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter cited as ECSC Treaty].
" Prior to 1965, each community had its own organs; the Neiger Treaty of 1965 inte-
grated the common institutions to create one council, one assembly, one judiciary, and one
commission. Within the ECSC Treaty, the original terminology is retained.
[1960] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 71.
" Id. at 80.
2 [1974] 2 COMM. MKT. L. R. 459.
3* Article 8 of Regulation 17 states:
1) A decision to issue a declaration under article 85, paragraph 3 of the Treaty
shall be valid for a specified period and may have certain conditions and stipula-
tions attached.
2) The decision may be renewed on request provided that the conditions laid
down in article 85, paragraph 3 of the Treaty continue to be fulfilled.
3) The Commission may revoke or alter its decision or prohibit those concerned
from taking certain courses of action:
a) where the de facto situation has changed with respect to a factor
essential in the granting of the decision;
b) where those concerned infringe a stipulation attached to the decision;
c) where the decision is based on false information or has been obtained
fraudulently; or
182 [Vol. 11:1
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in the applicant's favor. Instead, it claimed to be under a duty to in-
form only when there were "objections" that might lead to a deci-
sion unfavorable to the enterprise involved.31 The Advocate
General, in his submission to the Court, surveyed the laws of the
Member States and concluded:
My Lords, that review which I have sought to keep short, of the
laws of the member states, must I think on balance, lead to the
conclusion that the right to be heard forms part of these rights
which 'the law' referred to in Article 164 of the Treaty upholds
and of which, accordingly, it is the duty of the Court to ensure
the observance.32
The Commission sought to buttress its argument by pointing to
article 11 of Regulation 17, which contains no express provisions
entitling enterprises to submit their considerations as to com-
pliance with Commission requests for information. In reply to this
contention, the Advocate General asked:
What possible purpose can this two step procedure serve, unless
it be to afford an opportunity for any observations of the under-
takings or association of undertakings concerned, as well as of
the competent authorities of the relevant member state or
member states, to be made and considered before the Commis-
sion has reached a final decision?3
The Transocean Marine case demonstrates that enterprises have
a right to be heard before the Commission adopts a final decision.
This right underlies the EEC Treaty. Absent a provision whereby
enterprises could be heard prior to a final Commission decision,
the European Convention on Human Rights, to which all the
Member States of the European Communities are signatories,
might be violated.
The Member States of the EEC are committed to the protection
of fundamental rights. Yet, the Treaty establishing the EEC does
not contain any general provisions concerning the protection of
such rights. In Costa v. Ente Nazionale," the Court of Justice pro-
d) where those concerned abuse the exemption from the provisions of
article 85, paragraph 1, of the Treaty granted to them by the deci
sion.
In the cases covered by sub-paragraphs (b), (c) and (d), the decision can also be revoked with
retroactive effect.
" [1974] 2 COMM. MKT. L. R. at 471.
32 Id.
3 Id.
1' [1964] 3 COMM. MKT. L. R. 425.
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claimed the supremacy of community law over national law, but
neglected the protection of fundamental rights. Later, in its
reasoning in Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futter-
mittel v. Fa. Koster, Berodt & Co.,' the Court acknowledged that
the general principles of the common law comprise fundamental
rights which the Court is obliged to safeguard.
Indeed, the Court has held repeatedly that fundamental rights
constitute an integral part of community law. In Nold v. Commis-
sion," the Commission, acting within the powers granted it by the
ECSC Treaty, approved new marketing regulations for coal,
which increased the purchase requirements needed to qualify an
enterprise as a wholesaler. These requirements could not be met
by Nold, who was thus excluded from this group. Nold appealed the
decision claiming a violation of his property rights, as well as
his right to freedom of business activity. Both of these rights were
alleged by him to be protected by German national law, by the
constitutions of other Member States, and by several interna-
tional agreements, including the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights. Property rights and the freedom of
commerce and business were declared by the Court to be rights
entitled to protection under Community law.' However, the
appeal was dismissed by the Court because, with respect to
business activity, protection guaranteed by national constitutions
cannot be construed to extend to mere business interests or
expectations (of an individual firm), the uncertainties of which are
part of the nature of economic activity.' Thus, the Court con-
cluded that Nold's grievance was actually initiated by new devel-
opments in the economy, which reflected the drop in coal produc-
tion, and not with the Commission decision. The Court declared
that no right of Nold to property or to freedom of business acti-
vity was infringed upon by the Commission.'
Because all Member States of the EEC adhere to the European
Convention of Human Rights, the convention can provide a model
of what constitutes a fundamental right. Article 8 of the Conven-
tion guarantees respect for private and family life, and for home
and correspondence. Several cases have been brought to the Euro-
pean Commission of Human Rights challenging interference with
[19721 11 COMM. MKT. L. R. 255.
" [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. 491, [19741 14 COMM. MKT. L. R. 338.
3 Id at 354.
1 Id. at 355.
9Id.
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the right to privacy for personal correspondence. 0 In all of these
cases, the correspondence examined, detained, or otherwise in-
terfered with belonged to a prisoner. In the Golder Case, the
European Court of Human Rights hinted that the prevention of
crime may justify more interference with correspondence of a
prisoner than of a person at liberty."' The Court did not state to
what extent interference with the correspondence of enterprises
and undertakings is permissible. However, in Acciaieria di
Brescia v. High Authority,2 the European Court of Justice held
that article 8(1) rights of the Convention were similarly applicable
to legal persons. With the European Convention on Human Rights
as a model and the activities of the European Court of Justice in
the area of human rights as precedent, it is likely that the cor-
respondence of an enterprise or undertaking is protected by Com-
munity law.
During the period of debate over the substance and similarities
of articles 11 and 14 of Regulation 17, and over the question of fun-
damental rights, the Commission displayed no ambivalence. Be-
tween January 1973 and October 1979, the Commission, acting
pursuant to its interpretation of article 14, adopted decisions
ordering twenty-five investigations without first issuing written
authorizations.43 In National Panasonic, the Court of Justice ended
the speculation surrounding article 14 of Regulation 17. The Court
initially construed article 11(2), (3) and (5) and asserted that a
two-stage procedure definitely was stipulated therein, concluding
that "[alrticle 11 expressly makes the adoption of a Commission
decision subject to the condition that the [Commission] has
previously asked for the necessary information. . . ."" The Court
of Justice then focused on the language of article 14, noting that it
was "different in structure" from the language of article 11. The
Court stated:
[This provision does not of course prevent the Commission from
carrying out an investigation solely pursuant to a written
authorization given to its officials without adopting a decision,
but in other respects it contains nothing to indicate that it may
only adopt a decision within the meaning of Article 14(3) if it has
previously attempted to carry out an investigation by mere
authorization.45
Z. NEDJATI, HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 164 (1978).
"[19751 Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgment of Feb. 21, 1975 (Series A., vol. 18), 1 45.
[19601 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 71.
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, NINTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY [19801, at 83.
National Panasonic v. E.C. Commission [19801 3 COMM. MKT. L. R., 169, 185.
SId.
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In differentiating between the purposes of articles 11 and 14, the
Court of Justice added:
The difference in the rules on this subject contained in Articles
11 and 14 is explained, moreover, by the diversity of the needs
met by those two provisions. Whereas the information, which
the Commission considers necessary to know, may not as a
general rule be collected without the co-operation of the under-
takings and associations of undertakings possessing this infor-
mation, investigations, on the other hand, are not necessarily
subject to the same condition. In general, they aim at checking,
by measures such as those listed in the second subparagraph of
Article 14(1) of Regulation 17, the actual existence and scope of
information which the Commission already has and do not there-
fore necessarily presuppose previous cooperation by undertak-
ings or associations of undertakings in possession of the informa-
tion necessary for the check."
The Court refused to find a two-stage procedure requirement
within article 14(3), especially in light of what it perceived to be
the different purposes of articles 11 and 14. The Court viewed
article 11 as a vehicle for gathering information, and article 14 as
a means by which the Commission conducts an investigation.
National Panasonic argued that if the Court of Justice inter-
preted article 14 as not requiring that prior notice be given to the
affected enterprise, it would always be possible for the Commis-
sion to adopt decisions to investigate without first requesting in-
formation or giving prior notice. Therefore, the Commission would
be able to evade the protections and guarantees secured through
article 11 by resorting to the investigatory procedure of article 14.
In reply, the Court emphasized that such an argument did not
"take into account the distinction made by the regulation itself
between the 'information' referred to in Article 11 and the 'inves-
tigation' referred to in Article 14."'' The fact that during an inves-
tigation under article 14 the Commission can engage in activities
similar to those permitted under article 11 (e.g., request informa-
tion on specific questions concerning recordkeeping) "is not suffi-
cient to conclude that an investigation is identical to a procedure
intended only to obtain information within the measuring of Arti-
cle 11 of the regulation.""
" Id.
" Id. at 186.
" Id.
[Vol. 11:1
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The Court of Justice also found that the lack of notice prior to
the investigation constituted no infringement of National Pana-
sonic's fundamental rights. The Court agreed that article 8(1) of
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms provided pervasive protection for privacy. How-
ever, the Court observed that the Convention, applicable to legal
persons, acknowledges in article 8(2) that interference is
permissible to the extent to which it is in accordance with the
law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protec-
tion of health or morals, or for the protections of the rights and
freedom of others.49
The Court determined that the aim of Regulation 17 was to imple-
ment the competition rules of the EEC. Article 3(f) and articles 85
and 86 prevent distortion of competition, which might prove detri-
mental to the public interest, to individual undertakings, and to
consumers. Regulation 17 merely allows the Commission to main-
tain the system of competition envisioned by the EEC Treaty.'
Therefore, the power to conduct investigations without previous
notification was held not to infringe upon fundamental rights due
to the need to protect the public interest.
Regarding the right to be heard before a decision to investigate
is made, the Court stressed that the "right of defense is chiefly
incorporated in legal or administrative procedures for the ter-
mination of an infringement or for a declaration that an agree-
ment, decision, or concerted practice is incompatible with Article
85 ... ."' The Court of Justice held that the investigation pro-
cedure of Regulation 17 does not constitute an infringement or
render an agreement incompatible with article 85. "[I]ts sole objec-
tive is to enable the Commission to gather the necessary informa-
tion to check the actual existence and scope of a given factual and
legal situation." 2 Because this was an investigation under article
14 and not a procedure to terminate an infringement or to declare
an agreement incompatible with article 85, National Panasonic
had no right to be heard before a decision to investigate was
issued by the Commission.'
"Id.
' Id. at 187.
I d.
"Id.
Id. at 188.
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Although the Court purported to validate the Commission's
search under article 14 by differentiating between the functions of
that article and article 11, the Court failed to consider adequately
the practical ramifications of its decision. In prior interpretations
of Regulation 17, the Court accorded the Commission full discre-
tion in determining whether to use the investigatory procedure of
article 11 or article 14.' The Court's holding in National Panasonic
suggests that in addition to the Commission's full discretion to
determine the applicable article, once article 14 has been selected,
investigations may be conducted prior to requesting information
from the enterprise being investigated.
Under this holding, there is little incentive for the Commission
to conduct investigations under the procedure established pur-
suant to article 11. By using article 14, the Commission can obtain
the same information it could obtain under article 11, with less
expense, less time, and less trouble. No effective method exists
for ensuring that the Commission will not evade the guarantees of
article 11 by simply utilizing the procedure of article 14. The
Court's distinction as to "gathering information" under article 11
and an "investigation" under article 14 becomes a hazy one in
actual practice. As in the National Panasonic case, when the Com-
mission possesses little or no information to verify prior to the
investigation, the Commission is not checking the actual existence
and scope of information that it already possesses, but rather is
searching for additional information. Under such circumstances, it
appears that the proper procedure is provided in article 11.
The Court's holding allows the Commission considerable discre-
tion in deciding the appropriate procedure to utilize during an
investigation. Giving the Commission the latitude of determining
which procedure to utilize affords it the opportunity to centralize
power within its command. Thus, the Commission is able to deter-
mine the extent of its own powers.
The Advocate General declared in his opinion that no legislation
grants a party the right to a hearing prior to the adoption of an arti-
cle 14 decision. Although the right to a hearing may exist based
on the general rule "that a person whose rights are liable to be
affected by an administrative decision is entitled to be heard by
the authority concerned,"' this right is not absolute. One such
exception is invoked where according the right to a hearing
H. SMrr & P. HERZ0G, supra note 24, at 332.
' National Panasonic v. E.C. Commission [1980] 3 COMM. MKT. L. R., 169, 180.
[Vol. II:I188
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defeats the purpose of the decision.5 The Advocate General
claimed National Panasonic was such a case. Accordingly, if Na-
tional Panasonic were afforded the opportunity to be heard, it
would be provided an opportunity to destroy or conceal relevant
documents. However, the Advocate General failed to recognize
that this point could be argued under any circumstance where
potentially incriminating information is requested. Neither the
Advocate General nor the Commission cited any cases where in-
formation had been destroyed, although the Commission has con-
sistently used article 11's two-stage investigatory procedure,
which arguably gives an enterprise a chance to destroy or conceal
relevant documents. If this argument is accepted, it would apply
in every case, regardless of which article's investigatory powers
are used. The "exception" could be expanded to consume the rule.
The possibility of expanding the scope of the exception did not
appear to disturb the Advocate General, who was satisfied that
National Panasonic was not left without a remedy as article 14
preserves the right of judicial review. However, this right may
not be invoked until after the investigation. If the Court finds the
Commission's decision unlawful, it may order the Commission to
return all papers taken during the investigation, to destroy any
notes, and to cease using any of the information. This remedy,
however, is not always equitable. The rights of the individual or
corporation are already infringed upon in that the enterprise has
lost the use of business documents. Furthermore, an outside enti-
ty (the Commission) has seen important business papers. In addi-
tion, the Commission might have discovered detrimental informa-
tion beyond that which it originally sought, which might provide
the foundation for later investigations. Moreover, the right to
judicial review by the European Court of Justice is not immediate-
ly available. Many months may pass before the contested decision
reaches the Court. The National Panasonic case, for example, was
initiated by the corporation's challenge to the Commission deci-
sion to investigate adopted on June 22, 1979. The case was not
decided by the European Court of Justice until the following June.
This remedy, therefore, is not an effective substitute for the right
to be heard prior to a Commission decision.
The law of the EEC, being supranational in nature, may not be
overridden by any national constitutional provision. The Euro-
pean Court of Justice has declared, however, that respect for fun-
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damental rights constitutes an integral part of Community law.
Therefore, if infringement of a basic right is alleged, the Court
must determine whether any right inherent in Community law
has been violated. The basic rights emanate from the constitu-
tional traditions of the Member States and the "general principles
of law" valued in the political systems of Western Europe, includ-
ing democracy, liberty, and respect for the individual. 7 Article 8
of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
provides various privacy rights. These rights to privacy extend to
business premises of an individual or of a corporation.5 However,
in National Panasonic, the Court reiterated the principle that fun-
damental rights may be interferred with to protect interests of na-
tional security, public safety, or economic well-being, and for the
prevention of crime, for the protection of health, or for the protec-
tion of the rights of others. In effect, article 8(2), under the Court's
interpretation, provides a blanket exemption for the rights
enumerated in its preceding paragraph. When deemed necessary,
almost any presumed condition can be argued to constitute a threat
to the interests of "national security, public safety, or the economic
well-being of the country." The rights accorded by article 8(1),
therefore, are meaningless, unless paragraph 2 is given a narrow
construction, with only the most exceptional circumstances in mind.
However, the European Court of Justice has not adopted a narrow
construction. 9
The Commission was given vast rulemaking authority by the
Rome Treaty. Its responsibilities also have been expanded notably
57 Pescatore, The Protection of Human Rights in the European Communities, 9 CoMM.
MKT. L. REV., 78 (1972).
" Acciaieria di Brescia v. High Auth. [1960] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 71.
" The Court also held that National Panasonic's claim that the decision was illegal due to
insufficient reasons supporting it was unfounded. The Court declared that article 14 (3) of
Regulation 17 requires that the decision "specify the subject-matter and the purpose of the
investigation." The preamble to the decision stated that the purpose of the investigation
was to "check facts which might show the existence of an export ban contrary to the Trea-
ty." However, as has been shown previously, the Commission did not possess sufficient in-
formation to indicate the existence of this situation. The Commission's decision, therefore,
may have been based on mere intuition. These reasons are not sufficient grounds on which
to base a decision. The decision should include a clear, concise statement of the reasons to
inform the parties of their rights, as well as to inform both the Court and the enterprise
concerned that the Treaty provisions were correctly applied. German Government v. E.C.
Commission, [1963] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 63, 69; [1963], 2 COMM. MKT. L. R. 369.
If the statement of reasons is lacking or is insufficient, an essential procedural require-
ment has not been met. This alone may provide adequate grounds for annulment of the
decision pursuant to article 173.
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by powers conferred on it by the Council.' The proceedings of the
Commission are, in theory, of an administrative nature, and are
not judicial proceedings. A decision of the Commission, however,
is binding on the party to whom it is addressed. The need for appro-
priate safeguards is especially evident, given the Court's inter-
pretation of the Regulation and the latitude provided the Commis-
sion in determining which procedure to invoke. The right to
investigate involves a much stronger infringement of the party's
interests than the right to request information. Therefore, it is
desirable that stricter standards be applied to prevent procedural
abuse in antitrust investigations.
Jacqueline Stein
In addition to Regulation 17/62, giving the Commission more powers in regard to
granting exemptions, Regulation 19/65 and 2821/71 have authorized the Commission to
issue group exemptions under certain circumstances. The Council has also augmented the
powers of the Commission by providing it with authority pursuant to article 155 of the
Treaty.
19811
